We present a quantum digital signature scheme whose security is based on fundamental principles of quantum physics. It allows a sender (Alice) to sign a message in such a way that the signature can be validated by a number of different people, and all will agree either that the message came from Alice or that it has been tampered with. To accomplish this task, each recipient of the message must have a copy of Alice's "public key," which is a set of quantum states whose exact identity is known only to Alice. Quantum public keys are more difficult to deal with than classical public keys: for instance, only a limited number of copies can be in circulation, or the scheme becomes insecure. However, in exchange for this price, we achieve unconditionally secure digital signatures. Sending an m-bit message uses up O(m) quantum bits for each recipient of the public key. We briefly discuss how to securely distribute quantum public keys, and show the signature scheme is absolutely secure using one method of key distribution. The protocol provides a model for importing the ideas of classical public key cryptography into the quantum world.
INTRODUCTION
The physics of quantum systems opens a door to tremendously intriguing possibilities for cryptography, the art and science of communicating in the presence of adversaries [4, 5, 8, 9, 7, 6, 17, 14] . One major goal of classical cryptography is to certify the origin of a message. Much like a handwritten signature on a paper document, a digital signature [22, 21] authenticates an electronic document and ensures that it has not been tampered with. The importance of digital signatures to modern electronic commerce has become such that Rivest has written "[they] may prove to be one of the most fundamental and useful inventions of modern cryptography." [22] This is especially true of schemes where the signature can be recognized using a widely available reference. The security of all such public key digital signature schemes presently depends on the inability of a forger to solve certain difficult mathematical problems, such as factoring large numbers [23] . Unfortunately, with a quantum computer factoring becomes tractable [25] , thus allowing signatures to be forged.
We present a quantum digital signature scheme which is absolutely secure, even against powerful quantum cheating strategies. It allows a sender (Alice) to sign a message so that the signature can be validated by one or more different people, and all will agree either that the message came from Alice or that it has been tampered with. The scheme described here is somewhat cumbersome, but the underlying principles suggest novel research directions for the field of quantum cryptography. While quantum public keys are more limited than classical public keys, they remain more powerful than private keys, and the existence of an unconditionally secure quantum digital signature scheme suggests an as-yet unrealized potential for quantum public key cryptography.
Classical digital signature schemes can be created out of any one-way function [24] . f (x) is a one-way function if it is easy to compute f (x) given x, but computing x given f (x) is very difficult. This allows the following digital signature scheme [16] : Alice chooses k0 and k1, and publicly announces f , (0, f (k0)) and (1, f (k1)). Later, to sign a single bit b, Alice presents (b, k b ). The recipient can easily compute f (k b ) and check that it agrees with Alice's earlier announcement, and since k0 and k1 were known only to Alice, this certifies that she must have sent the message. The public keys can only be used once, unlike more sophisticated digital signature schemes, but this simple protocol serves as a good model for a quantum scheme. While there are many candidate one-way functions, none have been proven to be secure, and some, such as multiplying together two primes (the inverse being factoring the product), become insecure on a quantum computer. This deficiency leaves a substantial gap in the cryptographic landscape.
MAIN RESULT
We describe a digital signature scheme based on a quantum analogue of a one-way function which, unlike any classical function, is provably secure from an information-theoretic standpoint, no matter how advanced the enemy's computers. Our goal is to reproduce the primary advantages of classical public key cryptography in a quantum setting. These are twofold: First, a public key can be safely given to an opponent without endangering the security of the protocol. This reduces the security requirements involved in key distribution. Second, every recipient has the same public key, which simplifies key distribution further; someone who is unsure whether he has received a correct public key can compare with one from a different source or with a friend's copy of the key. Our protocol should not be regarded as the culmination of this line of research, but as proof of the principle that quantum protocols can have these properties.
The key idea we introduce is a one-way function whose input is a classical bit-string k, and whose output is a quantum state |f k (versus, for instance, a function which maps quantum states to quantum states). Like the above classical scheme, we will require O(m) quantum bits (qubits) to sign a m-bit message. It is not sufficient, however, to simply plug in |f k in place of f (k). First, due to the no-cloning theorem [20] , there can be no perfect equality test for quantum states. Also, as we show below, the nature of quantum states provides Alice with non-classical cheating strategies. And unlike classical schemes, only a limited number of copies of the public key can be issued, or the scheme becomes insecure. Despite these difficulties, the protocol we present, when used correctly, allows the probability of any security failure to be made exponentially small with only polynomial expenditure of resources. We begin by defining quantum one-way functions and discussing their properties. We then present our signature protocol and prove its security; this proof appears in two parts, separated by a discussion of key distribution. We conclude with some generalizations of and limitations to our protocol.
QUANTUM ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS
Ever since the invention of secure quantum key distribution [5] , many attempts have been made to exploit the unique properties of quantum systems to provide new cryptographic primitives. A great surprise was the failure of quantum bit commitment [19, 18] ; subsequently, less powerful but still interesting primitives such as quantum bit escrow [1] were introduced. Looking beyond cryptography, many more new quantum protocols have been discovered, such as quantum random access codes [2] and quantum fingerprints [10] .
Here, we introduce a limited-utility quantum one-way function, based on two properties of quantum systems [20] which are also essential for quantum fingerprinting. First, quantum bits, unlike their classical counterparts, can exist in a superposition of 0 and 1. The general state of a single qubit is written as a two-component vector |ψ = α0|0 + α1|1 = (α0α1), where |0 and |1 form an orthonormal basis for the vector space, and α0, α1 are complex numbers satisfying |α0| 2 + |α1| 2 = 1. Because of this continuous degree of freedom, distances between two qubit states |ψ and |ψ ′ naturally take on non-integer values (less than the maximum, 1), defined as 1 − | ψ|ψ ′ | 2 , where ψ|ψ ′ is the inner product between the two vectors. This becomes particularly interesting when considering the general state of n qubits, |ψ n = 2 n −1 j=0 αj|j , where the number of coefficients is exponentially larger than the number of qubits. It follows from simple volumetric arguments that sets of states {|ψ
′ where the set may have many more than 2 n states if δ < 1, meaning the states are not maximally distant from each other. In fact, as Buhrman, Cleve, Watrous, and de Wolf showed [10] , for δ ≈ 0.9, one may have a set of size 2
We shall make use of this property by taking all classical bit strings k of length L, and assigning to each one a quantum state |f k of n qubits. These states are nearly orthogonal:
′ , allowing L to be much larger than n. As mentioned above, for the quantum fingerprint states, L = O(2 n ) with δ ≈ 0.9. Another family is provided by the set of stabilizer states [20] , with L = n 2 /2 + o(n 2 ), and δ = 1/ √ 2. Both these sets are easy to create with any standard set of universal quantum gates. A third family of interest uses just n = 1 qubit per state, and consists of the states cos(jθ)|0 + sin(jθ)|1 , for θ = π/2 L , and integer j. This family works for any value of L, and gives δ = cos θ.
The second property we exploit is that although the mapping k → |f k is easy to compute and verify, it is impossible to invert (without knowing k) by virtue of a fundamental theorem of quantum information theory. Holevo's theorem limits the amount of classical information that can be extracted from a quantum state [15, 20] ; in particular, measurements on n qubits can give at most n classical bits of information. Thus, given T copies of the state |f k , we can learn at most T n bits of information about k, and when L − T n ≫ 1, our chance of successfully guessing the string k remains small. This means that k → |f k acts as a sort of quantum one-way function, with a classical input and a quantum output.
Certain important properties of classical functions are taken for granted which are no longer so straightforward quantummechanically. Given two outputs |f k and |f k ′ , how can we be sure that k = k ′ ? This is done using a simple quantum circuit [10] , which we shall call the swap test. Take the states |f k and |f k ′ , and prepare a single ancilla qubit in the state (|0 + |1 )/ √ 2. Next, perform a Fredkin gate (controlledswap) with the ancilla qubit as control and |f k ′ and |f k as targets. Then perform a Hadamard gate on the ancilla qubit and measure it. If the result is |0 , then the swap test is passed; this always happens if |f k ′ = |f k . Otherwise, if | f k ′ |f k | ≤ δ, the result |0 occurs with probability at most (1+δ 2 )/2. If the result is |1 , then the test fails; this happens only when k = k ′ and occurs with probability (1 − δ 2 )/2. Clearly the swap test works equally well even if the states are not outputs of the function f -if the states are the same, they always pass the swap test, while if they are different, they sometimes fail. The point is that an equality test exists, but fails with nonzero probability.
Another important property is the ability to verify the output of the function: given k, how do we check that a state |ψ = |f k ? This is straightforward: since the function |k |0 → |k |f k is easy to compute (here, |0 denotes an n qubit state), simply perform the inverse operation, and measure the second register. If |ψ = |f k , the measurement result will be nonzero with probability 1 − | ψ|f k | 2 . Thus, verification is also possible, but again it is probabilistic.
A naive quantum signature protocol. What happens if we simply drop in our quantum one-way function in place of the classical one in Lamport's signature scheme [16] (described above)? The protocol parameters L and n are fixed, and a map k → |f k is chosen by all parties. Alice generates k0 and k1 as her private keys, and publicly announces (0, |f k 0 ) and (1, |f k 1 ) as her public keys. As in Lamport's scheme, she then signs a bit b by presenting (b, k b ). Ideally, the recipient, Bob, would then want to test Alice's quantum public key for validity. He can do this using the verification test, to see if |k b |f f b maps back to |k b |0 . Furthermore, once Bob is satisfied with the validity of Alice's message, he would like to be able to pass it on to Judge Charlie, knowing that Charlie will also find the message valid. Unfortunately, Bob's test sometimes fails; furthermore, it irreversibly consumes one of Alice's public keys! Other potential problems arise as well. For instance, unlike the output of a perfect classical one-way function, from which someone with limited computational ability can learn nothing at all about the input, |f k always leaks a limited amount of information about k, the input to the quantum one-way function. Furthermore, quantum cheating strategies become available; for example Alice may want to make Bob and Charlie disagree on the validity of her message. How can we be sure that all of the copies of the public keys she hands out are identical? Along the same lines, Alice is free to prepare an entangled initial state, with which she can delay choosing k until after she has given |f k away. Her ability to do this spells the doom of any attempt to use quantum one-way functions to perform bit commitment [18, 19] , which is one application of classical one-way functions. But only Alice has the ability to change the state, and it will not help her in this instance. This saving grace enables us to use quantum one-way functions to perform digital signatures. Most of the new difficulties introduced by quantum states can be dealt with by using many public keys per message bit instead of just one. In the remainder of the paper, we discuss the details of this modification, and more importantly address the issue of Alice's quantum cheating strategies.
QUANTUM SIGNATURE PROTOCOL
We now present the signature protocol, beginning first with a definition of what such a protocol should accomplish and how its security is evaluated; following this we present the quantum protocol in detail.
Definition. We adopt essentially the usual definition of a one-use digital signature; that is, Alice has a set of private keys and all recipients have copies of the corresponding public keys. Given a message b, Alice can then produce a single signed message (b, s(b)). Conversely, given any message, signature pair (b ′ , s ′ ) any recipient can process the pair to reach one of three possible conclusions:
1-ACC:
Message is valid, can be transferred 0-ACC: Message is valid, might not be transferable
REJ: Message is invalid
The first two results imply that Alice sent the message b ′ . They differ in that result 1-ACC means the recipient is sure any other recipient will also conclude the message is valid (thus the message is "transferable"), whereas result 0-ACC allows the possibility that a second recipient might conclude the message is invalid (the number "1" or "0" refers to the minimum number of people who agree with the conclusion that the message is valid). Result REJ implies the recipient cannot safely reach any conclusion about the authenticity of the message. We require that any recipient who receives a correct message, signature pair (b, s(b)) always reaches conclusion 1-ACC.
Security criteria. The protocol should satisfy two security criteria. First, it should be secure against forging, which means that, even given access to a valid signed message (b, s(b)) and all available copies of the public keys, no forger has an appreciable chance of creating a message, signature pair (b ′ , s ′ ) (with b ′ = b) such that an honest recipient will accept it (conclusions 1-ACC or 0-ACC) except with exponentially small probability. Second, the scheme should be secure against Alice's attempts to repudiate the message. That is, for any pair of recipients, with high probability, if the first recipient reaches conclusion 1-ACC (the message is valid and transferable), then the second recipient also reaches conclusion 1-ACC or 0-ACC (the message is valid).
Our definition differs from the most common classical definitions in only three respects: First, the possibility of result 0-ACC is not available in most classical signature schemes (although some allow it). Second, we only require that the security criteria hold with high probability (again true of some classical schemes). Third, and most notably, the public keys in our scheme are quantum states rather than classical strings.
This protocol is applicable to a variety of cryptographic problems. For instance, Alice may wish to sign a contract with Bob such that Bob can prove to Judge Charlie that the contract is valid. In this case, Bob should accept the contract whenever he gets result 1-ACC for a message, and Charlie should accept unless he gets result REJ. This problem can also be solved by a variety of classical protocols, of course. However, most only offer security against computationally-bounded attacks. Others offer informationtheoretic security, but require additional resources during the key distribution phase (see section 6), such as a secure anonymous broadcast channel [11] or a noisy channel [13, 12] , which are difficult to justify as physical resources. In addition, the classical information-theoretic protocols use distinct private keys and require substantial interaction among the participants during the key distribution phase, whereas the quantum protocol we present below requires only a physically plausible quantum channel and modest interactivity quite similar to that required by classical public key distribution.
Quantum signature protocol specification. As the private keys for our protocol, Alice chooses a number of pairs of L-bit strings {k } (for each i) will then be Alice's public keys for an appropriate quantum one-way function f . The public keys are "public," in the sense that no particular security measures are necessary in distributing them: if a number of copies fall into the hands of potential forgers, the protocol remains secure. Note that the creation of these keys is up to Alice (or someone she trusts), because unknown quantum states cannot be perfectly copied, according to the no-cloning theorem [20] . We begin by making the simplifying assumption that all recipients have received correct and identical copies of Alice's public keys; we will revisit this assumption later in the paper.
All participants in the protocol will know how to implement the map k → |f k . All participants will also know two numbers, c1 and c2, thresholds for acceptance and rejection used in the protocol. A bound on the allowed value of c2 will be given as part of the proof of security, below. c1 can be zero in the absence of noise; the gap c2 − c1 limits Alice's chance of cheating. We assume perfect devices and channels throughout this paper, but our protocol still works in the presence of weak noise by letting c1 be greater than zero, and with other minor adjustments. We further require that Alice limits distribution of the public keys so that T < L/n copies of each key are available (recall that |f k is an n qubit state).
Alice can now send a single-bit message b using the following procedure:
1. Alice sends the signed message (b, k . Recipient j counts the number of incorrect keys; let this be sj.
3. Recipient j accepts the message as valid and transferable (result 1-ACC) if sj ≤ c1M , and rejects it as invalid (result REJ) if sj ≥ c2M . If c1M < sj < c2M , recipient j concludes the message is valid but not necessarily transferable to other recipients (result 0-ACC).
Discard all used and unused keys.
When sj is large, the message has been heavily tampered with, and may be invalid. When it is small, the message cannot have been changed very much from what Alice sent. sj is similar for all recipients, but need not be identical. As we shall see below, the thresholds c1 and c2 separate values of sj into different domains of security. Forgery is prevented by c2, and cheating by Alice is prevented by a gap between c2 and c1.
PROOF OF SECURITY I: FORGERY
We need to prove the security of this scheme against two scenarios of cheaters. In the first scenario, only Alice is dishonest; her goal is to get recipients to disagree about whether a message is valid or not (i.e., she wishes to "repudiate" it).
We will show that if one recipient unconditionally accepts (sj < c1M ), then it is very unlikely that another will unconditionally reject (s j ′ > c2M ). However, we delay this proof until after discussing distribution of the public keys.
The second scenario is the standard forging scenario. In this case, Alice and at least one recipient Bob are honest. Other recipients or some third party are dishonest, and they wish to convince Bob that a message b ′ = b is valid. Naturally, the forgers can always prevent any message from being received, or cause Bob to reject a valid message, but we do not consider this to be a success for the cheaters.
The security proof for this scenario is straightforward. In the worst case, the forger Eve has access to all T copies of each public key. By Holevo's theorem, Eve can acquire at most T n bits of information about each bit string k b ′ to go with it. However, since she lacks at least L−T n bits of information about any public key which Alice hasn't revealed, she will only guess correctly on about G = 2 −(L−T n) (2M ) keys. Furthermore, if she wishes to change a key whose identity she did not guess correctly, she has only probability δ 2 of successfully revealing the key. Each recipient measures M keys, so when b = b ′ , each recipient will find (with high probability) that at least ( 
public keys fail. We will pick c2 so that (1 − δ 2 )(M − G) > c2M , which means each recipient either receives the correct message, or rejects the message with high probability.
KEY DISTRIBUTION
For the first scenario, where Alice is dishonest, we will simplify to the case where there are only two recipients, Bob and Charlie. However, before tackling the proof, we must return to the issue of key distribution. Here, Alice wishes Bob (for instance) to accept the message and Charlie to reject it. Certainly, if Alice can give completely different public keys to Bob and Charlie, she can easily repudiate her messages; therefore, any signature scheme, classical or quantum, must be accompanied by a key distribution scheme to eliminate this possibility.
Classically, a straightforward assumption is that public keys are broadcast to all recipients; however, in practice this is seldom the case (the internet, for instance, is normally used as a point-to-point network), and creating a cryptographically secure broadcast channel is a highly nontrivial task. In the quantum case, we do not even have the possibility of a broadcast channel, so we must resort to other means. One straightforward solution is to assume the existence of a trusted key distribution center, which has authenticated links [3] to all three participants. Alice sends her public keys to the key distribution center, which performs swap tests between corresponding pairs of public keys. If any pair of public keys fails the swap test, the center concludes Alice is cheating; otherwise it forwards a copy of each public key to each recipient.
Alice can prepare any state she wishes for the public keys, including entangled states and states outside the family |f k . For instance, she can prepare a symmetric state, such as |ψ B |φ C + |φ B |ψ C . Because this state is invariant under swaps, it always passes all tests, so that the key distribution center concludes that Bob and Charlie will have the same key. But that is an illusion -clever trickery by Alice who can nevertheless arrange that Bob and Charlie disagree on the validity of the corresponding private key k i b . However, Alice cannot control which of them receives the valid key; it goes randomly to Bob or Charlie. Thus, since M is large, the difference |sB − sC| is O( √ M ) with high probability, which makes it very unlikely that Bob and Charlie will get definitive but differing results. That is, when one of them (say, Bob) accepts a message (1-ACC), that is sB < c1M , Charlie almost never rejects it (REJ), which would happen if sC > c2M . The gap between c1M and c2M protects them against Alice's machinations.
Of course, assuming a universally trusted third (or in this case, fourth) party always simplifies cryptographic protocols, so for the full proof, we wish to consider a more sophisticated scenario. In this case, we assume that Bob and Charlie have each received their public keys directly from Alice, perhaps in person, perhaps via a private key authenticated channel. Then to test their keys classically, Bob and Charlie would announce and compare them. For our quantum protocol, they can instead perform the following distributed swap test: Each of Bob and Charlie receives from Alice two copies of each public key (so there are a total of T = 4 copies of each public key in circulation). For each value of i and b, the recipients verify that they all received the same public key |f k i b . To do so, each recipient first performs a swap test between their two keys, then passes one copy to a single recipient (Bob, for instance). Bob then checks that these two test keys pass the swap test as well. If any keys fail either test, the protocol is aborted. Otherwise, discard the test keys. The remaining "kept" keys are used to verify messages in the main protocol.
A dishonest recipient can always cause the key distribution phase to abort, but nothing more. He could also allow a dishonest Alice to incorrectly pass the test, but the notion of a digital signature is only meaningful when at least two participants are honest. When Alice is honest, no cheater has an opportunity to alter someone else's public key, so the scheme remains secure against forgery.
We wish to emphasize that the above suggestions for key distribution are by no means the only possibilities. The distributed swap test can easily be generalized to the case of multiple recipients (see Section 8) , for instance, and many classical methods of key distribution can be adapted for the quantum case to allow a variety of security assumptions. Ideally, it would be possible to state a simple security criterion that would evaluate whether a given method of key distribution is successful or not without reference to the particular quantum public key protocol for which the keys are intended, but we do not attempt to formulate such a definition.
PROOF OF SECURITY II: REPUDIATION AND TRANSFERABILITY
We now return to the security of our digital signature protocol, and show that it prevents Alice from cheating (repudiating a message she has signed). Whatever the method of key distribution, some form of swap test is likely to be present, so we assume the use of a distributed swap test. Our goal is to compute the probability p cheat that Alice can pass all the swap tests but achieve |sB − sC| > (c2 − c1)M , meaning that Bob and Charlie disagree about the validity Note that a sum of type-1 terms (such as |ψ , above) may always pass the swap test, but also has equal amplitudes for Bob and Charlie to pass key verification. A type-2 term is any term including a |− a state for the kept keys, the test keys, or both. For the type-2 terms, we explicitly note the symmetry between the kept and test keys, meaning the superposition (|+
can appear. In particular, any sum of type-2 terms respecting this symmetry must have at least a 50% chance of failing the swap test. On the other hand, some superpositions of type-2 terms can give different chances for Bob and Charlie to pass key verification. Also note that the subspace of type-1 terms is orthogonal to the subspace of type-2 terms.
Expanding every set of keys in |Ψ in this way gives a global state which we can again divide up into two terms: |Ψ1 + |Ψ2 . Every summand in |Ψ1 contains at most r type-2 tensor factors, where r = cM for some constant c > 0; the rest are type-1 terms. |Ψ2 consists of terms with more than r type-2 tensor factors.
We wish to show first that for the state |Ψ1 , |sB − sC| will be small. If there were only a single summand in |Ψ1 , this would clearly be true, since each type-1 factor has an equal probability of contributing to sB and to sC , and there are only a few type-2 terms. However, different summands of |Ψ1 with different patterns of type-1 and type-2 states might interfere quantum-mechanically. To show |sB − sC| is small even in this case, it will be sufficient to look just at the kept keys, and furthermore only at the states |+ This allows us to simplify the problem. We can invoke the lemma from Appendix A to show that, for large M and sufficiently small c, the probability that |sB − sC| < (c2 − c1)M for |Ψ1 is exponentially small in M ; less than 2 −[1−H((1−c 2 +c 1 )/2)−H(c)]M , in fact, although this is not at all a tight bound.
For |Ψ2 , we wish to show that the probability of passing the swap test is very small. To see this, it will suffice to consider a modified swap test which passes any state of the test keys except |− a ; certainly the probability of passing this test can be no smaller than the probability of passing the original swap test. Since each type-2 term by itself has at least a 1/2 chance of failing the modified swap test, a tensor product of r or more of them passes with probability no larger than 2 −r . There can be no interference between different positions for the type-2 terms, since the modified swap test is compatible with the projection onto type-1 and type-2 terms. Therefore, the probability of |Ψ2 passing the swap test (original or modified) is at most 2 −r = 2 −cM . Since c > 0, this is exponentially small in M . Now we can put this together to obtain a bound on p cheat , which is the probability that the state both passes the swap test and produces |sB − sC| > (c2 − c1)M . The |Ψ1 term might have a good chance of passing all swap tests, but yields an exponentially small chance of giving the required separation between sB and sC. The |Ψ2 term might have O(1) probability of having |sB −sC | > (c2 −c1)M , but only has an O(2 −r ) chance of passing all swap tests. The best case for constructive interference between the two terms gives a total probability p cheat at most twice the sum of the two probabilities for |Ψ1 and |Ψ2 , which is still exponentially small in M . Therefore, Alice has p cheat ∼ O(d −M ) probability of successfully cheating for some d > 1.
GENERALIZATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
One straightforward generalization is to use the distributed swap test with many recipients. To do this, we can replace the swap test with a test for complete symmetry of s states [10] . Instead of preparing an ancilla in the state (|0 + |1 )/ √ 2, we prepare a superposition over states indexed by all permutations of s elements. Then perform the permutation σ conditioned on the ancilla being in the state |σ , and finally measure the ancilla to see if it remains in the original superposition. If the state of keys being tested is completely symmetric, it always will pass, otherwise it has some chance to fail. Furthermore, note that, for any state of the keys, the probability that any particular pair of keys out of the s keys being tested will fail a regular swap test is no larger than the chance that the full set of keys fails the symmetry test, so for any pair of keys, the symmetry test is at least as sensitive as the swap test.
The distributed symmetry test then allows public key distribution for t > 2 recipients. Each person receives t + 1 copies of each public key (so there are T = t(t + 1) copies in circulation) and tests them for complete symmetry. Assuming they pass, each recipient keeps one copy of each key to verify a signature, sends one copy to each of the other recipients to perform a second symmetry test, and keeps the last copy for his own symmetry test. Each recipient now has t test keys, and performs a symmetry test on those keys. He rejects the set of keys if it fails either of the symmetry tests he performed. If we restrict attention to any particular pair of recipients, this procedure essentially reduces to the distributed swap test again, so the proof of the previous section tells us that for any two recipients i and j, the probability that the keys pass the symmetry test but |si − sj | > (c2 − c1)M is exponentially small in M . This shows the signature protocol remains secure with the distributed symmetry test and many recipients.
We can also create additional thresholds to allow more than one transfer. That is, 0 = c0 < c1 < . . . < cq < 1, and if cr−1 < si < cr, for r ≤ q, then recipient j will (q − r)-accept the message. When a recipient s-accepts the message (result s-ACC), he is convinced the message is valid (it originated with Alice), and that any other recipient will at least (s − 1)-accept the same message. A recipient who 0-accepts a message is convinced it is valid, but is not sure someone else will agree with him (result 0-ACC). In other words, s-acceptance means the recipient is sure he can convince s other people of the message's validity sequentially, even if each wants to be sure later people accept it as well. The security of s-acceptance follows immediately from the proof of security in the last section, simply substituting cr − cr−1 for c2 − c1.
Another useful extension is the ability to expand the original symmetry test to additional groups of keys. Assume we have a single recipient Bob who communicates with two separate sets of recipients; we will assume Bob is not allied with the sender Alice. Suppose Bob receives s + 1 keys originally, and performs a test on them for complete symmetry. Then he keeps one key for verifying a signature, and uses some (but not all) of the s test keys to perform a distributed symmetry test with a group R1 of recipients. The extra test keys certainly do not affect the security of the distributed symmetry test. Suppose Bob uses the remaining test keys to perform a distributed symmetry test with a second group of recipients R2, possibly at a much later time. Then if Charlie is in R1 and Diane is in R2, we know that (with high probability) either the keys fail a test, or that |sB − sC| < ∆M and that |sB − sD| < ∆M for some ∆, in which case it is also true that |sC − sD| < 2∆M . In other words, even though Charlie and Diane have not interacted directly, the gap between sC and sD is still bounded, but by twice the margin between two recipients in the same group.
While we have described a procedure for signing single-bit messages, multi-bit messages can be sent by repeating the process, using M pairs of public keys for each message bit. However, a much more efficient procedure is to first encode the message in a classical error-correcting code with distance M , and to use a single pair of public keys for each encoded bit. The single-bit protocol can be viewed as a special case of this using a repetition code. Valid messages are codewords of the error-correcting code; to change from one valid message to another requires altering M bits. Therefore, the above security proofs hold with only two changes: G, the number of keys successfully guessed by Eve, is now 2 −(L−T n) (2N ), where N is the length of the full encoded message. In addition, if Alice attempts to cheat, she can produce a difference |sB − sC | proportional to N , not M , using type-1 terms. We should thus have M scale linearly with N when the latter is very large.
CONCLUSIONS
The digital signature scheme provided here has many potential applications. It combines unconditional security with the flexibility of a public key system. An exchange of digital signature public keys is sufficient to provide authentication information for a quantum key distribution session. Quantum digital signatures could be used to sign contracts or other legal documents. In addition, digital signatures are useful components of other more complex cryptographic procedures.
One particularly interesting application is to create a kind of quantum public key cryptography. If Bob has Alice's public key, but Alice has nothing from Bob, then Bob can initiate a quantum key distribution session with Alice. Bob will be sure that he is really talking to Alice, even though Alice has no way to be sure that Bob is who he says he is. Therefore, the key generated this way can be safely used to send messages from Bob to Alice, but not vice-versa.
However, quantum public keys have a number of disadvantages. It is not possible to sign a general unknown quantum state, even with computational security [3] ; this is unfortunate, since a common classical method for distributing public keys is to have a trusted "Certificate Authority" (whose public key is already well-known) sign them for later transmissions. However, perhaps this can be circumvented: the quantum public keys of our protocol are known quantum states, so perhaps there is some way to securely sign them for distribution at a later time.
Note that in a purely classical scheme, the public key can be given out indiscriminately. This cannot be true of a quantum scheme: when there are very many copies of a public key, sufficiently careful measurements can completely determine its state, and therefore one may as well treat the public key as classical. In that case, security must be dependent on computational or similar assumptions. Thus, any quantum digital signature scheme will necessarily require limited circulation of the public key. This is primarily a question of efficiency, since sufficiently large L allows many keys to be issued.
So how do the required resources scale with the number of recipients? There are three resources that one might consider: the size of each public key, the size of a single signed message, and size of the private key. In our case, a single public key need only scale as the logarithm of the number of receivers. This is good, since the public keys are made of qubits, which may be the most expensive component. However, the length L of the private key must be at least equal to T , the total number of public keys in circulation, which must be linear or quadratic in the number of recipients. It remains possible that an improved proof or protocol could reduce the required L substantially, although we are not optimistic on this point. However, this is not too serious, since the classical memory used to store the private key is already quite cheap. A more serious flaw in our current protocol is the requirement that the length of a signed message also scale linearly with L. There does not seem to be a fundamental requirement for this, luckily, so it seems plausible that an improved protocol is possible for which the length of messages scales at most logarithmically with T .
Scaling of resources with other variables can probably be improved as well. Earlier, we showed how to reduce the amount of key required to send long messages; perhaps further improvement is possible. Classical private-key authentication allows the expenditure of only a logarithmic amount of key in the length of the message; it is reasonable to speculate that similar efficiency could be achieved here. Efficiently signing known quantum states would allow this, for instance, since then we could sign a quantum fingerprint [10] of the message.
Since our scheme requires a new set of keys for each message, the total amount of key consumed also scales linearly with the number of messages sent. It would be preferable to reduce this to the levels allowed by classical protocols: the log of the number of messages, or even constant (although it seems unlikely that is possible). Either would imply substantial reuse of public keys. Designing such a protocol will be a difficult task, however, since usual classical techniques for reusing signature keys cannot be applied to quantum public keys.
In summary, we have demonstrated the existence of an unconditionally secure public key digital signature scheme, something which is not possible classically. Many potential improvements remain, however. The possibilities and ultimate limitations of quantum public key cryptography remain largely unexplored.
